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Abstract—Behavioral research can provide important insights
for SE practices. But in performing it, many studies of SE are
committing a normative fallacy they misappropriate normative
and prescriptive theories for descriptive purposes.
The evidence from reviews of empirical studies of decision
making in SE suggests that the normative fallacy may is common.
This article draws on cognitive psychology and behavioral eco-
nomics to explains this fallacy. Because data collection is framed
by narrow and empirically invalid theories, flawed assumptions
baked into those theories lead to misleading interpretations of
observed behaviors and ultimately, to invalid conclusions and
flawed recommendations.
Researchers should be careful not to rely solely on engineering
methods to explain what people do when they do engineering.
Instead, insist that descriptive research be based on validated
descriptive theories, listen carefully to skilled practitioners, and
only rely on validated findings to prescribe what they should do.
I. INTRODUCTION: DESCRIBING AND PRESCRIBING
BEHAVIOR IN SE
The emerging focus on behavioral studies of software engi-
neering is important: Without understanding what happens in
engineering practice, we cannot hope to improve it. But which
type of knowledge provides the foundation of such research?
Put simply, engineering prescribes what people should do it
develops normative frameworks such as methods that define
what should be done and how. In contrast, studies of behavior
describe and explain what people do in practice. In behavioral
studies of engineering, these two modes overlap, because they
strive to describe and explain what happens in practice in order
to prescribe what people could do better, and how, for some
standard of evaluation. For example, many studies design and
deploy new artifacts such as methods and tools into indus-
trial contexts, then study how they impact performance. But
practitioners frequently disregard newly developed methods
introduced by academic research [1]. Some teams may not
use the artifacts, or use them differently than expected. How
are the researchers going to interpret and explain this? Why
did this team not adopt the method we developed? What did
they do instead? How could we still help them to perform
better in practice?
To answer these questions, behavioral researchers collect
data about professional practice. When they organize this
empirical part of their study, they often rely on the toolbox
of theories they used to design the methods. The theories we
need to describe what people do, however, are of fundamen-
tally distinct nature and origin than the engineering methods
that prescribe what they should do. When it comes to how
people make decisions, these theories even carry mutually
incompatible assumptions. As a result, the tension between
description and prescription can lead behavioral researchers
to misunderstand practice in subtle but important ways.
The principal focus on description, explanation and analysis
on one hand, and prescription or action on the other hand, can
be used to distinguish two paradigms: Empirical research aims
to describe and explain behavior, while normative research
establishes standards to evaluate behavior [2]. Normative mod-
els such as SE methods, process models and quality models
establish standards for evaluation. But there is a significant
grey area because the object of empirical SE research is
prescribed by normative models. For example, SE methods
are sometimes treated as if they were programs to be run
by practitioners, even though they are more appropriately
described as one of the resources that practitioners use in
situated action [1].
Because research in SE often combines normative and
empirical elements, even research that understands itself as
empirical often relies on theories that are normative. As we
will see, some of these theories have limited empirical validity
- or none.
II. HOW PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS
The distinction between empirical and normative research,
and between descriptive, explanatory and prescriptive theories,
is not unique to SE. This article focuses on decision making
because it is central to SE and as a field, has been bifurcated
for decades as the tension between prescription and description
split the field into separate schools [3]–[6]. Behavioral SE has
much to learn from that history.
Multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) methods are cen-
tral to engineering methods. The normative framework of
MCDM arose out of the mathematical theories of Bernoulli
that prescribed how a theoretical agent should take optimal
choices between gambles under conditions of well-defined
probabilistic uncertainty. The entire body of work in utility
analysis is built on that starting point and has provided a
foundation for countless methods in SE. MCDM methods
prescribe how to analyze well-defined choice situations to
identify which decision should be considered optimal, based
on the assumption that the conditions and success criteria can
be specified. According to this family of theories, an agent
makes a decision by evaluating a set of options against a set
of weighted criteria, uses this matrix to create a ranking of
options, then selects the best option out of the set.
The underlying theory now called rationalistic in the field
of Judgment and Decision Making was never validated as a
descriptive framework for human thought. In the words of
Nobel prize winner Kahneman and Tversky, “The modern
theory of decision making under risk emerged from a logical
analysis of games of chance rather than from a psychological
analysis of risk and value. The theory was conceived as a
normative model of an idealized decision maker, not as a
description of the behavior of real people... [it] does not
provide an adequate foundation for a descriptive theory of
decision making” [7].
On the contrary, ample evidence demonstrates that it is
inconsistent with the reasoning processes of the human mind
[4]. Large-scale field studies in decision making observed and
interviewed professionals in a wide range of fields, including
military, surgery, firefighting, paramedics, and engineering.
The studies collected overwhelming evidence showing that
highly performing professionals did not evaluate multiple op-
tions against multiple criteria to compare them, rarely ranked
options, and rarely selected an option from a set. Instead, they
used their highly developed perceptual skills to match cues
in the environment to patterns in their experience in order to
generate one plausible course of action. They then used mental
simulation to predict what would happen if they pursued it,
and they adapted, adopted, or dropped one action at a time
in sequence, until they found one that was satisfactory. In
doing so, they often outperformed rationalistic approaches at
a fraction of the time [8].
Rationalistic models are appealing to researchers, because
their simple mathematical formulas promise a rigorous model
of human behavior that supports the collection of data, the
detection of deviations, and the design of interventions. As
proponents of these models have emphasized, there is also
normative value in these frameworks [9]. But none of this
provides descriptive validity [4], [10]. In fact, rationalistic
theories are descriptively inadequate in three important ways:
1) Their assumptions - that preferences are fixed priors,
that options are independent from each other, that pref-
erence relations are transitive, and that evaluation is
independent of irrelevant alternatives - are empirically
invalid [4], [7], [10]. The assumptions cannot be easily
adjusted, because they are the theories foundational
axioms [4], [10].
2) Their predictions are inconsistent with human behavior.
In order to avoid dropping the entire body of theory,
Tversky and Kahneman tuned the parameters of rational
choice to create Prospect Theory [11] and an influential
research program on heuristics and biases. However,
they retained the normative assumptions [4].
3) The methods used throughout this period of behav-
ioral research typically simplified choice situations into
context-free vignettes and polled participants for their
selection. It is a very efficient approach to data col-
lection, but much of this award-winning work has no
ecological validity – it describes the behavior of “people
in the lab”, not the behavior of people “in the wild”, and
thereby distorts most of the factors that apply to real-
world decision making [5, 36-50].
Despite their flaws, the appeal of rationalistic theories
proved so strong that they underpinned most empirical re-
search in cognitive psychology, behavioral economics and
adjacent fields for decades. As a leading behavioral economist
lamented, 50 years of dominance of the rational choice model
has left so many important questions unanswered [6]. SE
emerged within that period, and its behavioral assumptions
are firmly grounded in the normative camp.
III. THE NORMATIVE FALLACY IN SE
In performing behavioral studies of SE, description and
explanation need to be grounded not in a preconceived notion
of what people are supposed to do but situated in their
empirical reality. By staying attuned to the difference, we can
minimize the chance of committing the normative fallacy [12]
in empirical research: the inappropriate use of normative or
prescriptive theory for descriptive or explanatory purposes.
Suppose we study the behavior of participants facing a risky
software project situation. A series of 20 bugs were identified
in short sequence in a new system under development. They
appear somehow related, but it is unclear how. One is critical,
19 are severe. The team considers the business value of fixing
one critical bug equivalent to fixing 4 severe bugs. Most
team members want to focus all attention on the critical bug
first, but one claims to know how to fix all 20. Our study
participants must choose between two competing strategies:
Strategy (a) has a 90% chance of resolving the critical bug
in the system, Strategy (b) has a 33% chance of fixing all
bugs. Many participants readily choose (a). According to the
normative model, this is strictly speaking an error’, because in
its calculation, the expected value of option (b) is much higher,
at 1.9 over 0.9. (The empirical validity of that calculation
is dubious. Even statistically, the expected value is not a
reasonable approximation of a single gamble, only of a long
series of identical gambles [10].)
The normative fallacy comes into play when we frame
research questions and collect data. If we set out to describe
how participants make their choice, should we ask them “how
did you compute the value of each option?” Doing so would
mean committing the normative fallacy. Instead, we could ask
an open-ended question: “How did you reason about this?”. If
given a chance, participants will rightfully introduce concerns
outside the framing of the gamble that make it perfectly
reasonable for them to prefer option (a). They might say that
it can be communicated more effectively to the stakeholders;
hope that fixing the critical bug produces insights that help
fixing the others later; and believe that resolving the critical
bug first will reduce the stress on the team. These judgments
transcend the original framing of the gamble and situate it in
a broader context. They seem much more reasonable then the
normative assumptions of rational choice.
In behavioral SE studies, however, the normative fallacy
appears common. Systematic literature reviews in key areas
suggest that many studies in SE use prescriptive theories to
collect and interpret data about behavior for descriptive and
explanatory purposes [13], [14]. In an extensive systematic
literature review on Technical Debt decisions, we found that
of the few studies that performed descriptive empirical work,
all relied exclusively on rationalistic decision making theories
[14]. For example, when a peer-reviewed empirical study in
trade-off decision making asked participants about their use of
reasoning, the questions framed the situation exclusively using
the empirically invalid framework of rational choice:
• “What factors are considered when you make a decision
about when to fix a defect?”
• ‘’How are these factors weighted?”
These questions may appear perfectly normal, but only if we
take the normative theories of rational choice as descriptively
valid. They are not, so the questions above simply fail to
adequately capture the participants reasoning [4]. Examples of
similarly structured questions seem common in SE. A second
systematic review about studies of trade-off decisions in SE
came to the same conclusion [13]. Again, data collection
in empirical studies was predicated on the narrowly framed
concepts of rationalistic decision making: factors, weights,
ranking, and choice. Broader considerations of reasoning,
including the role of expertise, experience, cognition, incen-
tives, mental simulation, judgment and perception were not
considered.
This is not to say that participants in this example should not
consider a set of factors simply that their individual and team
reasoning processes will take forms that will remain invisible
to those who perform the study [5]. Crucially however, because
these questions are posed in the context of a scientific study
by an academic research team with scientific credentials, the
participants certainly provide answers to them. In doing so,
they will retroactively construct plausible explanations. Papers
uncritically reporting these answers, though not empirically
valid, often pass peer review, because most reviewers in SE are
not trained in behavioral research or psychology. The findings
are then cited to support further normative research. Imagine
if the study above had instead asked an open-ended question:
“How did you decide when to fix a defect?”
In cognitive psychology, Kleins studies provided a pivotal
turning point toward naturalistic decision making. Klein re-
counts vividly how difficult it was for his research teams to
drop the normative assumptions and listen to the data. It took
remarkable insistence on the part of their study participants to
push back against the assumptions carried by normative theo-
ries, especially the assumption that decision making functions
by comparing alternatives [8].
It is time that SE research follows this lead: When studying
how software professionals act in industry settings, do not be
led astray by the normative frameworks of software engineer-
ing [1]. Instead, rely only on theories and methods with proven
empirical validity. When studying decision making, emphasize
the importance of naturalistic decision making theories, as at
least one study has done [15].
IV. LISTEN TO THE DATA
Just as in behavioral economics, the dominance of the
rational choice model in software engineering has left many
important questions unanswered. This is just as much an
issue of practice as it is an issue of theory or methodology,
because the normative fallacy carries an important corollary:
Deviations from the normative model of decision making are
generally labelled as bias’ and error’. But that disregards the
well-established fact that the normative model itself has no
descriptive validity in the first place.
Our central example of the normative fallacy in SE is the
reliance on rationalistic decision making theories in behavioral
SE. Additional examples abound. The normative theory of
process models is used widely to structure data collection of
empirical studies, to interpret and analyze the data, and to
describe what happened in these projects. But the theory is
derived from normative origins and lacks empirical validity
[16], so many of these studies may well be committing the
normative fallacy. This would render their findings question-
able at best and invalid at worst, and emphasizes the relevance
of competing, empirically grounded theories [2].
Similar normative fallacies undermine studies of method
adoption. The frequently observed disregard of practitioners
for new methods [1] may often be based on a well-founded
judgment call grounded on expansive experience and a holistic
assessment of a new methods value. Yet, researchers focused
on normative ideals may be quick to dismiss it as gut feeling,
rather than hard data gathered through proper measurement, as
one study writes. Cognitive psychology has long rehabilitated
what this quote dismisses as gut feeling as sophisticated
forms of reasoning that transcend rationalistic frameworks,
encompass them as one possible strategy among many, and
apply them for the narrowly specified situations for which
they are useful [8]. If researchers choose an empirically invalid
theory as the baseline, we should locate error and bias firmly
on their side.
V. AVOID THE NORMATIVE FALLACY
Currently, a large segment of behavioral studies of SE
may be committing a normative fallacy: they misappropriate
prescriptive theories for descriptive purposes. It is important
to note that SE is not alone in incorrectly basing empirically
oriented research about decision making on rationalistic theo-
ries with dubious merit - other disciplines have grappled with
this too.
The normative fallacy has far-reaching consequences: Be-
cause data collection is framed by narrow and empirically
invalid theories, flawed assumptions baked into those theories
lead to misleading interpretations of observed behaviors and
ultimately, to invalid conclusions and flawed recommenda-
tions. As a side effect, the sound judgment of practitioners
is sometimes dismissed as a defect to be fixed. But methods
to support practice will be most effective when they are based
on rigorous studies of practice using appropriate frameworks
[1].
Practitioners judgment and insight should be central to
behavioral research in SE. Researchers should be careful not
to rely solely on engineering methods to explain what people
do when they do engineering. Instead, they must insist that
descriptive research be based on validated descriptive theories,
listen carefully to what skilled practitioners say and do, and
only rely on validated findings to reason about prescribing
what they should do.
Practitioners should similarly watch out for the normative
fallacy and avoid acting on research that is not appropriately
situated in real practice. When deliberating, keep in mind
that a resistance to simplistic reduction is often not a sign
of irrationality but a trait of sound judgment.
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